This paper looks at the performance record of M&As that took place in the European Union financial industry in the period 1998-2002. First, the paper reports evidence on shareholder returns from the merger. Merger announcements implied positive excess returns to the shareholders of the target company around the date of the announcement, with a slight positive excess-return on the 3-months period prior to announcement. Returns to shareholders of the acquiring firms were essentially zero around announcement. One year after the announcement, excess returns were not significantly different from zero for both targets and acquirers. The paper also provides evidence on changes in the operating performance for the subsample of merges involving banks. M&As usually involved targets with lower operating performance than the average in their sector. The transaction resulted in significant improvements in the target banks performance beginning on average two years after the transaction was completed. Return on equity of the target companies increased by an average of 7%, and these firms also experience efficiency improvements.
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Introduction
The number of banks in the European Union fell over the period 1997 to 2003 from approximately 9,600 to slightly more than 7,400, a reduction of 23% [ECB (2004a) ]. This decline came jointly with an increase in the importance of the banking sector in the economy.
The growth of banking assets outpaced that of GDP during this period. Deregulation, technological progress, the introduction of the euro and increased competition have all led to this process by which more inefficient banks were absorbed by larger more efficient institutions. However, in spite of this concentration, the bulk of mergers and acquisitions in The underlying motives for engaging in an M&A transaction have to deal with the efficiency gains reflected in lower costs and higher profits involved in the merger, the geographical diversification generated from the merger, the improvement in the competitive position and the increase in the ability to generate value to consumer by the cross-selling of products. Most of the studies of merger activity point to efficiency gains as the major source of value creation, while the net increase in revenue generated from the merger tends to be small [Houston and Ryngaert (1994) ].
Among the key efficiency developments that determine the rationale for M&As in the financial sector lies the achievement of economies of scale and the opportunity to cut costs by eliminating overlapping operations and consolidating backroom operations. Restructuring of operations from a merger is always a difficult enterprise. In the case of international M&As, dealing with cultural differences among staff or lines of business or differences in regulatory and accounting systems, requires significant resources. The ECB report cited above concludes that "acquisitions with the objective of increasing efficiency and achieving cost savings may risk being less successful than anticipated, owing to the complexity of the operation (including risks of personal or cultural clashes) or to other reasons such as labour market rigidities."
These difficulties in exploiting the efficiency gains from a M&A, especially in the case of cross-border transactions, get reflected in the stock market reaction upon the announcement of an M&A transaction. There is an abundant literature using an event study methodology trying to ascertain whether bank mergers create value. Most of these studies refer to events in the US banking system and do not offer a clear general conclusion. Among the more scarce European studies, Beitel and Schiereck (2001) in a study of value creation to shareholders upon announcement of an M&A transaction report that returns to shareholders of the acquiring firm tend to be negative as the size of the acquiring bank increases and, in particular, international mergers within Europe destroy shareholder value. In a similar event study analysis of 54 M&As deals in 13 European banking markets, Cybo-Ottone and
Murgia (2000) find, on average, a positive and significant increase in stock market value at the time of the deal announcement but this effect is not found for the subsample of cross-border deals.
The goal of this paper is to provide an assessment of the success in mergers and acquisitions activity involving European financial enterprises since the creation of the euro. For
this purpose, we first analyze the stock market response of the firms involved in M&As deals in the European financial industry. More precisely, we conduct event studies of the stock market performance of these firms at different time horizons around the announcement of the deal. We then go beyond the event studies and perform a detailed analysis for a restricted sample of financial firms, the banking industry. For the banks involved in M&A activity we identify their basic characteristics in terms of their operating and accounting performance. We explore the impact of the deals in the ex-post performance of the banks involved in a transaction according to these parameters. In our analysis, we pay especial attention to the differences in the intensity of value creation or in the ex-post performance of the merging enterprises in terms of the geographical scope of the merger and the relative size of the merging companies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the recent developments in M&A activity within the European financial sector. Section 3 provides a short literature review of the main finding in this area. Section 4 describes the sample of M&As deals used in the event studies and presents the results of such analysis. Section 5 documents the characteristics of the banks involved in M&As transactions during this period and the impact on the performance of the merging banks. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0516 2 Recent trends in M&A activity within the European financial sector 1 Overall M&A activity in the euro area, measured by transaction values, experienced a significant boost after 1997. This increase was also perceptible in the number of transactions that went from just over 9700 in 1997 to a peak of 16750 firms in 2000. This increase in the volume of M&A activity was not only due to the increase in the number of transactions taking place but mainly due to a large increase in average transaction size with the total volume of M&A transactions involving EU firms reaching an all time high of almost €2000 billion in 2000.
Beyond 2000, the volume of M&A activity declined jointly with the deceleration in economic activity and the fall in the stock market valuation of corporations.
The financial industry followed a similar pattern of M&A activity during this period:
very intense during the late nineties and considerably weaker from 2001 to 2003 (see Figure 1 ). M&A operations in the EU financial sector area increased in number during the period 1997-2000 by over 47%. This growth was very similar between euro member countries (a 49% increase) and non-euro member countries (47%). These transactions implied an important qualitative change in terms of industry structure. Merger transactions prior to this period mostly involved smaller financial enterprises and had a goal of reducing costs and improving efficiency [Cabral et al. (2002) ]. In the late 1990s, invested volumes increased as these transactions were more aggressive in pursuing market access and enhancing the competitive position of the firms involved in the by now more integrated national markets. The volume of transactions differed by line of business within the financial sector and, more importantly, by geographical scope. Most of the mergers in the financial industry were accounted for by banks. This was specially the case within the euro zone. Bank mergers in non-euro EU countries were significantly less important. This is probably due to the higher level of banking concentration already existing in the non-euro area countries (Denmark, Sweden and UK) relative to the euro member countries.
Concerning the geographical scope of the merger deals in the financial industry of the euro area, most of the transactions were among domestic firms. This pattern was particularly strong in the banking sector although, as This lack of integration in the retail banking segment is also reflected in the large differences in explaining the breakdown of net income from the different national retail banking industries. J.P. Morgan (2004) calculates the breakdown of the net income reported by banks from different European countries into their components by banking products (Figure 3 ). Despite the decline in interest rates within the euro area over the last decade, more traditional products such as checking accounts contribute more than 50% of total profits to retail banks in certain European countries, such as Germany. By contrast, in the anglosaxon and nordic countries, these traditional products account for less than 20% of industry profits.
Asset management, and other products addressing long-term savings, account for 32% of banking profits in the UK, while these products contribute less than 15% of profits in Germany and France. This heterogeneity in the sources of value by product in the different national banking markets reflect underlying differences in the functioning of these markets in the European Union and they imply an important barrier to developing financial integration within the Union. The mergers allow banks to improve their market positioning in the overall market and increase their cross-selling of financial products.
The empirical literature has focused on three main aspects: the type of mergers that appear to be value creating in event studies, the measurement of improvements in efficiency and operating ratios of the resulting institution and the impact of regulatory changes in the success of market integration. We will look at these three lines of literature in tandem.
The first line of research focuses on the stock market reaction of the firms involved upon the announcement of a transaction. A number of studies have performed this analysis in different samples covering the US and European banking sectors. These studies use eventstudies of stock market performance around the announcement of the merger to obtain excess returns to shareholders and, in a second stage, correlate these excess returns with some of the key characteristics of the transaction. Houston and Ryngaert (1994) look at a sample of US domestic mergers and find that on average a merger does not create shareholder value. Shareholder wealth is shifted from the shareholders of the acquiring bank, whose share price usually falls, to those of the target bank. They do find a positive correlation between value creation from the merger and the past operating performance of the acquiring bank, the degree of overlap in the markets in which both banks operate, and the deals financed with cash. Overall, more profitable banks tend to buy less profitable banks. Pilloff (1996) also finds in a sample of US mergers that abnormal returns are correlated to gains from economic efficiencies. Those mergers that offer the greatest potential for cost reduction measured by geographic overlap and pre-merger cost measures (total expenses and noninterest costs of the target bank) have the highest returns from merger. Finally, value creation from market related considerations has also been reported in the U.S. markets. Kane (2000) finds that mergers are likely to generate value when the target bank is a large deposit institution, and when both firms are headquartered in the same US state, indicating potential for increases in market penetration. involved entities. The study considers thirteen potential value drivers for the merger ranging from relative size, to profitability and cost efficiency. The study finds that overall returns for the combined (target and acquirer) entity are higher for non diversifying transactions, when the acquirer is engaged in few M&A transactions and when the target exhibits a poor past stock performance. Campa and Hernando (2004) also looking at a sample of E.U. mergers, financial and non-financial, report that larger value creation occurs in mergers in regulated industries, such as the financial sector, when both companies involved are from the same country. This increase in value generated from higher geographical market concentration from mergers has raised some concerns among regulators and competitors on their social desirability. More market concentration may lead to more market power and higher prices hurting consumers.
This view does have some empirical support. Prager and Hannan (1998) report a reduction in the deposit interest rates paid by banks resulting from large local mergers, while small mergers show no significant effect on the interest rate paid to customers. 4 Corvoisier and
Gropp (2002), analyze the banking system of the euro area over the period 1993-1999 and did not find a homogeneous effect on pricing from increases in concentration. They report that pricing for loans and demand deposits became less competitive, whereas this did not happen in the pricing for savings and time deposits. They attribute the lack of price increases in the latter product to the achievement of cost savings from economies of scale.
The second line of research has focused on evaluating the expected gains from the merger in terms of post-merger operation improvements. One conclusion from the event studies reviewed above is that regardless of the underlying sources of value creation, there seems to be consistent evidence that financial markets are quite sceptical about the potential involved in the transaction were financial firms (within SIC 60 to 67) and both were publicly traded companies. We started from a sample of 244 transactions that took place during this period.
5 Table 1 provides some information on the sample composition. The UK (56 buyers)
and Italy (46 buyers) accounted for the majority of transactions in the sample followed by Germany and France. The vast majority of these transactions (181) were domestic transactions, i.e. involved two institutions from the same country.
The sample varied significantly by segment within the financial service industry.
Almost half of the sample (120 acquirers) included depository institutions within the European Union, followed by holdings and other financial firms (42 acquirers) and by insurance companies (34). There were also 48 transactions that took place in the real estate business,
i.e. either the target or the acquirer was a real estate company. We decided to drop these observations from the sample. We also decided to drop from the sample those transactions in which the buyer already owned 50% of the targeted company (14 deals), and some outliers in terms of the excess returns of either the acquirer or the target firms (10). 6 As a result we conclude with a final sample of 172 transactions. In this sample, 104 observations involved banking institutions. We use this later in the analysis of ex-post performance in section 5. For this banking sample we removed 27 withdrawn deals, 8 pending deals and 3 outliers (in terms of some performance variables of the banks involved).
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We performed event studies around the announcement date of the merger (t). We analyzed the excess returns to the target and acquirer through three distinct periods around minus the expected return during that period. The expected return is calculated using the CAPM during the six months prior to the event window using as the measure of market return the financial sector market index from the companies respective country. 8 The results of this analysis for the sample of bank mergers are reported in 7. In particular, in two deals one of the merging banks had a capitalisation ratio above 75% and in one transaction one of the involved banks had a ROE below -50%. 8. We also estimated expected returns relative to the broader general market index of the respective country and the results were essentially the same to those reported in the paper. For acquirers the distribution of excess returns around announcement is substantially different. Average excess returns are negative and of the order of -1%. There does not appear to be any significant excess return during the run-up period prior to announcement.
Excess returns also experienced a wide dispersion around this average number. The median excess return is very close to zero indicating the presence of a few events of large positive returns. In fact, the percentage of acquirers that experienced negative excess returns around announcement is around 55%.
Long-run returns differ substantially from short-run returns. One year after the merger announcement, excess returns for both buyer and acquirers are negative and fluctuate in the interval -2.4% to -4.4%. Median excess returns, a year after the merger, are substantially lower in absolute value. It is worth noting that in the case of targets long-run returns (both average and median) are significantly lower than short-run returns. However, the equality between excess returns over the announcement period and those over the long-run horizons is not rejected in the case of the acquirer companies. Overall, around 60% of the target firms display negative excess returns one-year after the merger. The share of acquiring firms displaying negative excess returns is much closer to 50%. In both cases average excess returns are smaller than median returns in these long-run windows. Excess returns are clearly positively skewed, with a few firms obtaining large positive excess returns. Interestingly, shortrun and long-run returns are uncorrelated for both targets and acquirers. However, this correlation is lower and non significant when an outlier with a very low long-run excess return is removed from the sample.
As summarized in the previous section, most of the literature highlights substantial differences among financial mergers depending on whether they are domestic or international. Domestic mergers are supposed to allow better exploitation of economies of scale from rationalization of the branch network, and reductions in redundant back-office operations. We split the sample between domestic and international mergers and compare average (top panel of Table 3 ) and median (top panel of to targets are substantially lower in cross-border mergers than in national mergers, this difference being significant over one pre-announcement window and one short-run postannouncement window. In the case of acquirers, the sign of this difference depends on the considered window. Median excess returns to targets are somewhat lower than those to acquirers in cross-border mergers, the opposite being true for short-run windows in domestic mergers.
We also split the sample among large and small mergers depending on the size of the deal, measured by the joint market capitalization of the merging companies. Mergers in the lower (upper) quartile of the distribution were considered small (large) mergers in the analysis. 12 The differences are quite striking especially in the long-run. In the short-run excess returns to targets and acquirers do not differ significantly in large and small deals. Large deals in contrast show much different behavior from small deals one-year after the merger. Small deals had an average (median) combined excess return of -17% (-6%). This returns was split between an average (median) excess return for shareholders of the target firm of -14% (-5%) and an average (median) excess return of -21% (-9%) for the shareholders of the acquirer. In contrast total average excess return in large deals was positive at around 6%, with shareholders of the acquiring bank obtaining a positive excess return of approximately 8%. As we only use half of the deals, the problem of lack of significance is even more pronounced.
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indicates the relative size of the merging companies [RSIZE] . 13 Given that excess returns are estimated values, we use GLS in the estimation, and use the inverse of the standard error in the estimation of the expected return for each transaction as the weighting scheme. Table 5 displays the results for the excess returns to target and acquiring shareholders as well as for the weighted average of both excess returns. Consistently with the descriptive statistics presented before, domestic mergers imply significantly higher returns for shareholders of the target firm with no significant impact on the return to bidders. Transactions involving firms more different in size (in most cases, a target significantly smaller than the acquirer) imply a higher return for targets. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the acquisition of smaller targets is less complex and thus value creation might be less problematic.
Interestingly, this effect is significant only around the announcement date, suggesting that news on who the specific parties involved in a transaction are does not leak to the market.
Finally, focusing on long-run windows, we find that large M&A transactions resulted in higher positive excess returns for acquirers than smaller transactions, although the difference is not statistically significant. This result might be reflecting that the degree of overlap between two large merging companies is usually high and therefore large deals show a greater potential for cost reduction.
13. RSIZE is defined as: ( ) ( ) 2 amv tmv tmv 5 . 0 − + where tmv and amv denote the market capitalisation of the target and acquiring companies, respectively. Note that this variable reaches its minimum value, zero, when the two companies are equally sized and is increasing as the relative size between both companies is greater.
Effects on performance of financial M&As
This section analyses the accounting and economic evolution of the firms involved prior to the transactions and compares these characteristics with their performance after the transaction.
For this part of the analysis we focus on the transactions that took place in the banking industry. Given that we are also going to look at their economic performance after the transaction took place we restrict our analysis to the sample of 66 completed deals in the banking sector. We look at measures of profitability (return on equity Table 6 reports descriptive statistics on the value of these financial ratios for target and bidder banks. The top two panels report the value of these ratios the year prior to the completion of the merger. We report the value of each ratio at each quartile of the sample distribution as well as the median of the difference of these ratios with respect to the average values in the industry. 15 Acquirers display a slightly higher return on equity than targets. In both cases, the merging banks exhibit on average a better performance measured in terms of ROE than their corresponding market. Acquirers also show better (lower) cost to income ratios than targets. Moreover, acquirers display a better cost efficiency ratio than the average bank in their country. Targets have larger loan to total assets ratios than acquirers. In fact, while targets show a higher proportion of loan activity than the average bank in their industry, acquirers show the opposite. More importantly, target banks show a clearly higher risk profile in their lending activity. Loan loss provisions measured both in terms of total assets or in terms of the net financial margin are substantially higher in the target banks than the acquirers. All these facts suggest that bidder banks present a better risk profile than targets.
The lower panel of Table 6 displays similar statistics of the same financial ratios for the sample of acquiring banks but measured two years after the completion of the transaction. Overall, there are not substantial changes in the financial performance of the bidder banks. Median ROE slightly improves. However, this improvement appears to be more linked to the overall behavior of the industry than to the transaction, since median difference in ROE relative to the industry slightly declines. The efficiency ratio of the banks does not change significantly, however this ratio improves (decreases) significantly relative to the market. The median bidding bank has an efficiency ratio that is 10% lower than the industry average. Regarding the risk profile of the bidder banks, engaging in these M&A deals does not seem to imply a substantial increase in the risks supported by these banks, although a small increase in the median values of both ratios of loan loss provisions is observed. The
14.
The appendix provides a detailed description of each of these ratios and of the data sources used. 15. The average for the industry is defined as the value of each ratio for the country of each firm. This ratio is computed using the aggregate national information from all banks reporting to Bankscope in the year prior to the completion of the deal. The results of this analysis are reported in Tables 7 (for targets) on capital. The estimated increase in ROE is of the order of 6% to 7% and it becomes significant two years after the completion of the deal. The absolute value of this effect remains, although it is non-significant in t+4 and t+5 probably due to the reduced number of observations for targets four and five years after a merger deal. Column (5) shows that the effect on ROE is larger if the deal takes place in a cyclical downturn but the difference is not significant. There is also not a significant difference in the impact on ROE neither between domestic and cross-border mergers nor as a function of the relative size of merging banks.
There is also a significant positive impact in the net financial margin of target banks.
This effect is decreasing over time and it is only significant in the first year after the deal. In fact, the effect is only significant for deals that became effective in a cyclical downturn 16. Alternatively, we run regressions with the performance variables adjusted by the mean of the industry in the specific country and year. The measure of market performance was however very noisy due to the limited Bankscope coverage for some countries. For this reason, we report results for the unadjusted performance variable but introducing country and time dummies. In any case, results must be interpreted with caution since changes in performance may reflect not only the impact of the transaction but also the trend in market performance.
(column 6). This effect seems to be mostly driven by the movement in interest rates in the period 2000-2002. As with the impact on ROE, the effect on net financial margin does not differ between domestic and cross-border mergers or as a function of the relative size of merging banks.
The ex-post performance of the bidder banks (Table 8) shows a slightly negative impact on ROE. The ROE of the bidder banks in the two years after the deal is 2% below its predicted value, although the effect is not significant. The net financial margin of these banks increases and it becomes significant four years after the transaction reaching an improvement of 0.7 percentage points. No differences in this effect are found according to the geographical scope of the deal, the cyclical situation in which the merger took place or the relative size or the merging banks.
Bidding banks show a marked difference in their cost to income ratio depending on whether the merger was domestic or international (column 8). International mergers show a decline in the cost to income ratio of the bidding banks. This effect remains several years after the merger. However, this efficiency ratio does not significantly change for domestic mergers.
This result is consistent with the fact that excess returns to acquirers are generally lower in domestic deals (see Tables 3 and 4) , what results paradoxical since, as discussed in section 2, domestic deals a priori offer more potential for cost savings. The positive coefficient of the interaction term RSIZE*POSTFUS implies that the impact on efficiency is lower the higher is the difference in the relative size of the companies involved in the merger. The initial set of M&A deals includes 244 transactions in which both firms involved were financial firms of a country belonging to the EU-15 and both were publicly traded companies.
We started from a sample of all transactions involving firms from group 6 classification. We picked all transactions involving publicly traded EU firms.
Returns on individual equities. Source: Datastream
For each of the companies involved we use daily series of the total return index on the stock. 
Information on final performance: Source BankScope
Bankscope is a financial database compiled by Fitch-IBCA containing financial information, mostly from balance sheet, income statement and applicable notes in audited annual reports of banks and depository institutions. Targets  Acquirers  Targets  Acquirers  Targets  Acquirers   Austria  3  3  2  2  0  0  Belgium  8  10  3  6  0  2  Denmark  11  8  10  7  3  1  Finland  2  1  1  0  0 Differences in cumulative median abnormal returns to target, acquirer, and value creation between national and cross-border mergers and between between large and small mergers. Abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between shareholder returns and expected shareholder returns, measured using the CAPM. Each column of the table reports the statistics for the distribution of abnormal returns over a different interval around the announcement date, t. Table 5 . Regression analysis of excess returns
Announced M&As deals. Financial Institutions
0 F r a n c e 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 7 4 Germany 31 39 26 32 8 12 G r e e c e 1 0 7 9 6 4 3 Ireland 1 3 1 2 1 0 I t a l y 4 6 4 0 4 0 3 5 1 8 1
Targets Acquirers
The dependent variable are estimated excess returns around the announcement of the transaction relative to the performance of the national financial market index, over the window in days indicated in the top of the column. DOMESTIC i s a dummy that takes the value 1 if the transaction involves two companies of the same country. BANK is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the transaction involves two banks. RSIZE is defined as: ((tmv/(tmv+amv)-0.5)**2) where tmv and amv denote the market capitalisation of the target and acquiring companies. SMALLDEAL (LARGEDEAL ) is a dummy that take the value of 1 if the joint market capitalization of the involved companies is in the first(fourth) quartile of the distribution. Table 6 . Descriptive statistics of financial ratios of target and acquirer banks (1) The definition of the variables is reported in the Appendix.
Ex-ante characteristics of target banks
Ex-ante characteristics of acquirer banks
Ex-post characteristics of acquirer banks
Distribution of performance measures for the target and acquiring banks involved in a sample of 66 completed M&A transactions involving EU banks in the period 1998-2003. Each measure is calculated for the target and acquirer banks on the year prior to the effective completion of the transaction, and for the acquirer bank in the second year after the completion of the transaction. The last column, reports the median difference with respect to the average for the corresponding national industry, defined as the aggregate ratio from all banks reporting to Bankscope.
( 
